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Abstract
Tracing criminal ties and mining evidence from a large network to begin a crime case analysis has been difficult
for criminal investigators due to large numbers of nodes and their complex relationships. In this paper, trust networks
using blind carbon copy (BCC) emails were formed. We show that our new shortest paths network search algorithm
combining shortest paths and network centrality measures can isolate and identify criminals’ connections within a
trust network. A group of BCC emails out of 1,887,305 Enron email transactions were isolated for this purpose. The
algorithm uses two central nodes, most influential and middle man, to extract a shortest paths trust network.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The task of identifying links and location of a criminal within a network of a large set of people is a difficult
one [1]. Often it is easier to identify criminals by taking a subset of the given network [2]. In this paper, particular
subsets of the emails from the Enron email database, namely emails with bcc recipients are used to isolate possible
criminal trust subnetworks. We combine social network measures with the shortest path algorithm to achieve this
aim.
Social network analysis is regularly used to investigate and view communities as networks of individual rela-
tionships that consist of people or organisations that are grouped using their common features [3]. Such networks
represent entities as nodes or vertices, depicting the communication or other relationships among them via edges.
A number of tools are used to analyse networks. The shortest path algorithm [4] is a graph theoretic tool used in
social network analysis to retrieve information about individual relationships and to identify the strongest connection
between nodes in a criminal network [5], [6]. Strong relationship between nodes depends on the different purposes
and roles of each node. A central node is defined as the most important node based on various factors, for example,
on the number of in-coming or out-going connections, the number of times the node appears in all paths, the number
of times the node appears adjacent to a target node, etc. See, for example [7].
In this paper, we use the Enron database which contains more than a million email transactions. Many researchers
from different backgrounds have worked on various aspects of the Enron data to detect important nodes [8], and
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2business processes [9], identify manager-subordinate relationships [10] and explore organisational behaviour [11].
In [12], the total weight of shortest paths of Enron email hypergraphs was used to identify important persons.
Shetty et al. [9] predict the occurrence of an email sequence of a given length and show that choosing different
lengths of sequences gives different sets of influential nodes within the group of higher authorities. Email transaction
shortest paths between Enron employees have also been studied by various researchers. Tang et al. [13] analyse the
shortest path according to the time taken by a sender to deliver an email to a recipient using spread of a message
to show the importance of a person to retain a communication. Similarly Yelupula et al. [14] used email flow and
numerical analysis to predict the hierarchy of Enron management. One of the features used was the number of
email addresses in the TO, CC and BCC fields. Hershkop [15] suggests that if it was possible to find a rule to
represent the appearance of To, CC and BCC addresses then it would be easy to distinguish the pattern which
violates the norms. Stolfo et al. [16] compile a list of recipients of a particular sender and reduce it by removing
all the duplicates. This list was later divided into different subsets which were used to model user cliques. Any new
clique that violates the normal pattern is detected as abnormal. List of recipients’ accounts have also been used to
determine communication behaviour measures [17].
Distinct from other research, our paper uses only emails that have at least one BCC recipient. The main reason for
choosing BCC recipients is because the ‘to’ and ‘cc’ recipients are visible to every recipient, while ‘bcc’ recipients
are inherently secretive [18], [19]. Keeping the recipients concealed and not revealed to the other recipients creates
a trust between the sender and BCC recipients [20]. This trust can be based on certain types of relationships, for
example a bcc recipient can be a friend, a business partner, manager, etc. to the sender [20]. Categorizing trust
level involves different subject areas for example, a person’s skill, knowledge, behaviour [21], recommendation or
opinion [22].
There are no studies on usage of only those emails that have BCC recipients to form a trust network. In this
paper, we isolate groups of criminals who are linked in this trust network. For this purpose, we show that the
shortest path concept together with centrality measures can be used for grouping and possibly identifying criminal
connections in a network, using the publicly available Enron email dataset [23] and corroborating our work with
published information about the crimes that led to the collapse of Enron [24].
In the next section, we give the background for our work, including network centrality measures, shortest paths
and details of the crimes that occurred within Enron. In section III we present our statistical analysis of Enron
BCC recipients and further tighten the scope of our research. Section IV gives the shortest path network search
algorithm. Section V discusses the experiments conducted and the discovery of several shortest paths trust networks.
In Section VI, we present a test to show that the algorithm works well in a different investigative scenario and in
Section VII, we dicsuss the results obtained. Finally we give the conclusion and future work.
II. BACKGROUND
A network is a graph that consist of vertices represented as points and edges as lines that connect its end vertices
[3]. Our analysis involves unique steps to obtain the criminal links within the BCC network. Many different centrality
3measures are used in social network analysis to identify nodes of importance (central nodes). One such important
node is the node with highest eigenvector centrality, called the hub. A node has high eigenvector centrality when
it is connected to many nodes that have high degree [3]. This measure is an indicator of the popularity that tends to
identify centers of large cliques [25]. Hansler [26] in his project calculates eigenvalues to rank people based on the
number of emails sent and received in an email network. Kayes et al. [27] use the eigenvector centrality measure
to find influential bloggers in a blogging community. Influential bloggers are the nodes with useful information
related to a topic that are also connected to other nodes of the same type.
Another important node that we consider is the node with highest betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality
of a node is equal to the number of times the node appears in the shortest paths that bridge one node to another
or one component to another [3]. Tayebi et al. [28] rank criminals using the betweenness centrality measure and
identify a key player in a co-offending network.
Arun et al. [29] propose an algorithm that greedily selects nodes in a variety of situations such as in a co-
authorship network to achieve maximum sampling and combine several different centrality measures including
eigenvector centrality and betweenness centrality to rank influential nodes. In our research, we call the node with
highest eigenvector centrality as the “most influential” (MI) and take a node with high betweenness to be playing
the role of a middleman (MM). The shorter the paths from a criminal to the MI, the less isolated is the criminal,
indicating that it is positioned in between highly linked nodes. The nearer a criminal to the MM, the higher the
possibility the criminal could be using the MM to influence other nodes or criminals. Thus, we find the shortest paths
from criminal to nodes with highest betweenness centrality and eigenvector centrality to form a closely connected
network.
A network path consists of a sequence of nodes connected by edges [3]. For example {v1, e1, v2} represents a
path between two nodes v1 and v2 with e1 the edge between v1 and v2 [3]. Connecting multiple paths forms a
network. A path in a network can be categorised as directed or undirected. A directed path is an edge that comprises
of a start node which points to a specific end node. An undirected path consist of an edge connecting two nodes
with no direction pointing either way [3]. In this research, we will focus on directed paths. The length of a path
is the number of hops from the start node to the end node. A node, vi is located one hop away from node vj , if
node vj is adjacent to node vi, that is there an edge from vi to vj . Thus, the path length from node vi to vj is 1
[3]. Similarly, path vi to vj has length three if the number of edges or hops from vi to vj is 3.
A network of n nodes and m edges may contain multiple paths connecting one node to another. If multiple paths
exist from vi to vj , a shortest path is a geodesic path between these two nodes such that no shorter path exists [3].
The terms detailed above are used throughout this paper.
History of Enron and its Collapse
In July 1985, Enron Corporation was created by Kenneth Lay through merging Houston Natural Gas, a utility
company, and Omaha-based InterNorth, a gas pipeline company. Kenneth Lay became the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) and Chairman of Enron [30]. From 1988 to 2001, Enron opened branches in many countries, expanding its
4business and becoming the middleman for energy trading between the United Kingdom, Europe, South America
and India [30]. Enron’s hidden aim [30] was to earn commissions through regulating the fluctuating energy price
in the market, which was due to increasing competition between old and new suppliers. In early 1990, Enron’s
Gas Bank helped Enron Corporation emerge from a business of piping gas to secure a prominent place in energy
tradings between suppliers and consumers [30]. In the 1990s, Enron became an exceptionally large player in the
United States’ energy market. In 1998, Andrew Fastow was employed as the Chief Financial Officer of Enron [30].
After the colapse of Enron in 2001, Andrew Fastow was convicted of planning and designing a complex web
of offshore partnerships and questionable accounting practices [30]. U.S authorities seized up to USD 23 million
United States’ assets from Andrew Fastow and his family members. The report by Thomsen and Clark from Division
of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [31] shows that the cash came from illegal business
transactions that Andrew Fastow arranged [31]. Andrew Fastow was shown to be involved in covert side deals,
earning money through sham transactions or money laundering [31]. Besides Andrew Fastow, 9 others [24] (Table
I) were convicted of money laundering. Each had a different involvement in the money laundering crime. In this
paper we extract the ego networks of these criminals and construct a new shortest path network, aiming to indicate
a trusted sub-network.
TABLE I: Enron money laundering criminals
Name ID Email Address
Andrew Fastow 686 andrew.fastow@enron.com
Andrew Fastow 687 andrew.fastow@ljminvestments.com
Lea Fastow 11010 lfastow@pop.pdq.net
Lea Fastow 11009 lfastow@pdq.net
Kevin Hannon 10068 kevin.hannon@enron.com
Kenneth Rice 9994 kenneth.rice@enron.com
Rex Shelby 15224 rex.shelby@enron.com
Rex Shelby 15225 rex shelby@enron.net
A.Khan 205 adnankkhan@hotmail.com
Michael Kopper 12708 michael.kopper@enron.com
Ben Glisan 1369 ben.glisan@enron.com
Joe Hirko 8716 joe.hirko@enron.com
S.Yaeger 861 anne.yaeger@enron.com
Table I shows the list of criminals involved in Enron money laundering crime [23], [24]. The ID in the table is a computer
generated number assigned to distinct email addresses.
Even though there are 10 criminals in this list, there are more than 10 email addresses as some of the criminals
have more than one email address. There are distinct links from each of these email addresses to different recipients,
hence we do not merge the email addresses of a particular criminal.
5III. EMAIL GROUPING AND THRESHOLD LIMIT
Yasin et al. [2] point out that taking only a part of a large amount of data from a network helps to reduce the
complexity of identifying criminals. A subset that occurs within the Enron email dataset are those that have BCC
recipients. The bcc-ed email carries the email addresses of some recipients who are kept concealed from other
recipients. We will use this categorisation to narrow the search scope, since within the 1,887,305 emails, there are
60649 emails with BCC recipients, giving a sizeable subset. We start with statistical analysis to further reduce our
search space. Within the bcc-ed emails, a large group, 17784 emails, had 33.73% of recipients bcc-ed ; that is,
approximately 1 out of 3 recipients were bcc-ed. From Figure 1, it is clear that the majority of emails had at most
5; 1 to 4 BCC recipients.
Fig. 1: Number of BCC recipients in emails. The majority of emails have at most 5, that is, 1 to 4 BCC recipients.
Based on the statistical findings, the BCC email group was divided into two different groups; emails with more
than 5 recipients and emails that had at most 5 recipients. There were 34195 emails with more than 5 recipients,
with a small number of these emails having large bcc recipient lists. The ratios of bcc-ed recipients in the group
with more than 5 recipients were calculated. Figure 2 shows that there were some abnormal scenarios detected when
BCC recipients in emails with more than 5 recipients were plotted. For example, 1 recipient out of 948 recipients
was bcc-ed. Emails that have large lists of recipients would not typically imply a trust relationship, rather a quirk
of the email system or just an information security practice. Thus, this subset was not used for analysis.
6Fig. 2: The BCC recipients in emails with more than 5 recipients. Note that there are some abnormal scenarios,
such as 1 recipient out of 948 being bcc-ed.
Next, the emails that were sent to at most 5 recipients were analysed. There were 26454 emails of this type. On
average, out of 5 recipients between 1 and 2 recipients were bcc-ed. Based on this, our analysis was restricted to
those emails where only one or two recipients were bcc-ed. We called these the 1-BCC and 2-BCC email networks
respectively. The 1-BCC network consists of 5290 nodes 17838 edges whereas the 2-BCC network consists of 3766
nodes and 13486 edges. These two subnetworks are analysed in section V. The next section describes the shortest
paths network search algorithm.
IV. THE SHORTEST PATHS NETWORK SEARCH ALGORITHM
The R igraph [32] package was used to create a network graph of all emails with either one or two recipients
bcc-ed (the 1-BCC and 2-BCC groups). The process of obtaining a new network is displayed in Algorithm 1.
A. Details of terms used and functions
The following abbreviations of terms are used in the algorithm:
AC := [Array of criminals]
Ci := [ith Criminal]
ECi := [Ego / ith criminal in the list AC]
NECi := [Ego / i
th criminal’s subnetwork]
MINECi := [Most Influential Node in NECi ]
MMNECi:= [Middle Man Node in NECi ]
OC := [Other Criminals in the ego subnetwork NECi ]
R := [Result]
Ci is a criminal and each criminal is stored in an array, AC . For each iteration, we take a criminal Ci from AC
as an ego and refer to it as ECi. An ego can be any suspicious entity. In our BCC email network analysis, Ci
7refers to the criminals involved in the Enron money laundering crime as stated in Table I. NECi is the i
th criminal’s
subnetwork, also called the ego subnetwork. An ego subnetwork is a network which comprises of all the vertices
reachable from the ith ego, ECi, all the vertices from which ith ego, ECi, is reachable and all the links connecting
these two sets of vertices. The set of all the vertices reachable from an ith ego, ECi, is called the out-component
and the set of all the vertices from which ith ego, ECi, is reachable is called the in-component. A vertex vj is
reachable from vertex vi if vj was bcc-ed in an email from vi. If there exists more than one email from vi to
vj where vj was bcc-ed then we simplify it by removing multiple links. MINECi and MMNECi are the most
influential node and the middle man node in the ego subnetwork NECi respectively. OC refers to other criminals
in NECi not including the ego ECi. R denotes the result that is obtained from each step of Algorithm 1.
Despite the different subject matter exchanged between a sender and a recipient, a directed unweighted BCC
shortest paths network graph is formed where the edge between one node to another shows a trust relationship (see
Figure 3). To start with, we identified the criminals that existed in both the 1-BCC and 2-BCC email groups. In the
1-BCC email network, only Andrew Fastow (686 and 687), Lea Fastow (11010, 11009), Kevin Hannon (10068),
Kenneth Rice (9994), Rex Shelby (15224, 15225) and A. Khan (205) exist. Meanwhile, the criminals that exist in
the 2-BCC network are Andrew Fastow (686 and 687), Lea Fastow (11010, 11009), Kevin Hannon (10068), Ben
Glisan (1369), Kenneth Rice (9994) and Rex Shelby (15224). The rest of the criminals, 3 of the 10, didn’t appear
in either the 1-BCC or the 2-BCC networks.
From the same ego subnetwork, NECi , we also extract the shortest paths from other criminals in the array, AC ,
to the MI and the MM followed by extracting the shortest paths from the ECi to the other criminals. In the last
step of the algorithm, all the shortest paths are combined to give a shortest path network, showing each criminal’s
position and the network association pattern. The steps are shown in Algorithm 1.
8Algorithm 1 Criminal shortest paths network search algorithm
A. Store the criminals, Ci to Cn in an array AC
B. Form subnetwork of each ego and follow the steps below until all ego subnetworks have been tested.
for i = 1 to n do
1. Select a criminal, Ci from AC as ego, ECi.
2. Retrieve the ego subnetwork NECi .
(a) connection from ego to MI in ego subnetwork NECi
(i) Find MINECi .
(ii) Find the direct path from ECi to MINECi .
if exists then
retrieve from graph and output it, then go to (b)...R1
else
go to (a)(iii)
end if
(iii) Find the shortest path from ECi to MINECi .
if exists then
retrieve from graph and output it, then go to (b)...R2
else
go to (b)
end if
(b) connection from ego to MM in ego subnetwork NECi
(i) Find MMNECi .
(ii) Find the direct path from ECi to MMNECi .
if exists then
retrieve from graph and output it, then go to (c)...R3
else
go to (b)(iii)
end if
(iii) Find the shortest path from ECi to MMNECi .
if exists then
retrieve from graph and output it, then go to (c)...R4
else
go to (c)
end if
(c) connection from OC to MI and MM in ego subnetwork NECi
for i < n do
(i) Set OC = {ECj |j 6= i}.
(ii) Find the shortest path from OC to MINECi in NECi .
if exists then
retrieve from graph and output it, then go to c(ii)...R5
else
go to c(iii)
end if
(iii) Find the shortest path from OC to MMNECi in NECi .
if exists then
retrieve from graph and output it, then go to (d)...R6
else
go to (d)
end if
end for
9Algorithm 1 Criminal shortest paths network search algorithm (continued)
(d) connection from ego to OC in ego subnetwork NECi
for i < n do
(i) Set OC = {ECj |j 6= i}.
(ii) Find the shortest path from ECi to OC in NECi .
if exists then
retrieve from graph and output it...R7
end if
end for
end for
C. Merge R1-R7 into a network
V. SHORTEST PATHS NETWORKS
In this section, we present the discovery of the 1-BCC and 2-BCC shortest paths networks and the result of these
two networks’ analyses. As mentioned before, an edge exists from a node A to a node B only if A sent an email
on which B was a BCC recipient.
A. Discovery of 1-BCC shortest paths trust network
We start by investigating Andrew Fastow’s ego subnetwork in the 1-BCC network followed by the other criminals’
ego subnetworks. Note that in the 1-BCC network, only one of Andrew Fastow’s two ego subnetworks exists, that is
andrew.fastow@enron.com (686) exists, but andrew.fastow@ljminvestments.com (687) doesn’t. The connection from
Andrew Fastow to the MM (16383 - sara.shackleton@enron.com) and the MI (19075 - vince.kaminski@enron.com)
were retrieved. This step was repeated for the other criminals in Andrew Fastow’s ego subnetwork. Finally the
algorithm found the shortest paths from Andrew Fastow to the other 5 criminals in his ego subnetwork.
Next, two other criminals’ ego subnetworks were found; Lea Fastow (11010) and Kevin Hannon (10068). On
retrieval of Kenneth Rice (9994) and A.Khan (205)’s ego subnetworks, there were only 2 and 3 nodes respectively.
In these small groups, paths don’t exist due to two scenarios; betweenness centrality value does not exist or two
nodes obtained the same eigenvalue. Similarly, the algorithm drops Lea Fastow (11009) and Rex Shelby (15224,
15225). Following this, the most influential and the middle man were picked from Lea Fastow (11010) and Kevin
Hannon (10068)’s subnetworks. In both cases, we obtained the same MI and MM as in Andrew Fastow’s ego
subnetwork. Combining the results obtained from running algorithm 1, the 1-BCC shortest paths trust network was
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constructed (see Figure 3).
Fig. 3: The 1-BCC criminals’ shortest paths trust network. The MM (16383 - Sara Shackleton) and the MI (19075
- Vince Kaminski) are indicated. All the criminals who occurred in this trust network, Andrew Fastow (686), Lea
Fastow (11010) and Kevin Hannon (10068), are highlighted.
1) Result (Figure 3) of 1-BCC shortest paths trust network: The network shows the criminals and the nodes
that are closely connected to them. Out of the 6 criminals existing in the 1-BCC network, only Andrew Fastow
(686), Lea Fastow (11010) and Kevin Hannon (10068) were extracted. The criminals are located within a range of
2 to 5 hops from the MM and the MI. We also notice that Louise Kitchen (louise.kitchen@enron.com (11370)), Jeff
Skilling (jeff.skilling@enron.com (8024)) and Michael (Mike) McConnell (mike.mcconnell@enron.com (12935))
occur the most number of times connecting Andrew Fastow (686), Kevin Hannon (10068) and Lea Fastow (11010)
respectively to other nodes. In this shortest paths trust network, all three of these nodes are adjacent to the criminals.
B. Discovery of 2-BCC shortest paths trust network
Next we ran the algorithm on the ego subnetworks of Andrew Fastow and the other criminals in the 2-BCC
email group. Both of Andrew Fastow’s (686 and 687) subnetworks were extracted. Here too, the two important
central nodes in both of the Andrew Fastow’s (686 and 687) subnetworks were (sara.shackleton@enron.com -
16383), the MM and (vince.kaminski@enron.com - 19075), the MI. In both of Andrew Fastow’s (686 and 687)
ego subnetworks, only Kevin Hannon (10068) was connected to the most influential and middleman. The algorithm
was also applied to each of the other 5 criminal subnetworks that exist in the 2-BCC email group. The result of
the algorithm is the 2-BCC shortest paths trust network (See Figure 4).
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Fig. 4: The 2-BCC criminals’ shortest paths trust network. The MM (16383 - Sara Shackleton) and the MI (19075
- Vince Kaminski) are indicated. All the criminals who occurred in this trust network, Andrew Fastow (686, 687),
Lea Fastow (11010), Kevin Hannon (10068), Ben Glisan (1369), Kenneth Rice (9994) and Rex Shelby (15224),
are highlighted.
1) Result (Figure 4) of 2-BCC shortest paths trust network: All 6 criminals were found within the 2-BCC
shortest paths network; they are Andrew Fastow (686, 687), Lea Fastow (11010), Kevin Hannon (10068), Ben
Glisan (1369), Kenneth Rice (9994) and Rex Shelby (15224). Out of these, Andrew Fastow (686, 687), Ben Glisan
(1369), Rex Shelby (15224) and Kenneth Rice (9994) did not have an out-component but acted as end nodes.
The criminals who had out-components were Kevin Hannon and Lea Fastow. In this trust network, there exists a
seperate single connection from Lea Fastow (11010) to Andrew Fastow (687). The only criminal that has a path
to the MI and MM is Kevin Hannon in the range of 2 to 4 hops away. The node that connects Kevin Hannon to
other nodes the most is Sherri Sera (sherri.sera@enron.com (16926)) followed by Greg Piper (6667).
The position and connections of criminals with other nodes could be used for further investigation. In the next
section, we test the ability of the shortest paths network search algorithm on a scenario where an investigator is
at the beginning stages of an investigation with no information about who the criminals may be. He only suspects
that a money laundering crime is occurring.
VI. FIRST SUSPECT TEST
The first suspect test replaces all criminals with a group of people who are potentially under suspicion. Each
combined shortest paths network in these tests is analysed separately and the number of criminals who occurred
are counted. The purpose of these experiments is to find a suitable sparse subgraph to start an investigation.
This money laundering first suspect test is started by investigating the Enron officials who were involved in
financial account management. In the financial network, financial managers act as egos. The union of financial
managers’ network from the BCC network consist of shortest paths from each financial manager (ego) to the
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MI, to the MM and from one financial manager to another. The financial managers are Sherron Watkins (sher-
ron.watkins@enron.com (16929)), the Head of Enron Global Finance, Andrew Fastow (andrew.fastow@enron.com
(686), andrew.fastow@ljminvestments.com (687)), the Enron Chief Financial Officer, Ben Glisan (ben.glisan@enron.com
(1369)), the Enron Corporation Treasurer, Rick Causey (rcausey@enron.com (15077)), the Chief Accounting Officer,
Jeff McMahon (jeffrey.mcmahon@enron.com (8071)), the Chief Financial Officer of Enron after Andrew Fastow.
We notice that this list of financial managers includes two criminals; Andrew Fastow and Ben Glisan. We assume
that the investigator would not know this in the beginning stage of a crime investigation. The next part shows the
result of our first suspect test on the 1-BCC and 2-BCC financial managers’ networks.
A. Result of first suspect test in 1-BCC financial manager network
Figure 5 shows the union of financial managers’ shortest paths. In this shortest paths trust network two financial
managers, Andrew Fastow (andrew.fastow@enron.com (686)) and Jeff McMahon (jeffrey.mcmahon@enron.com
(8071)), occurred. Note that Andrew Fastow was the only criminal identified here with no other criminals appearing.
Louise Kitchen (louise.kitchen@enron.com (11370)) was in between Andrew Fastow and other nodes the most
number of times. Meanwhile, Bruce Garner (2058) connects Jeff McMahon the most to other nodes. We also
compared the nodes that occurred in subgraphs in Figure 5 and in Figure 3. The results are discussed in section
VII.
Fig. 5: The 1-BCC financial managers’ shortest paths trust network. The MM (16383 - Sara Shackleton) and the
MI (19075 - Vince Kaminski) are indicated. Besides Andrew Fastow (686) who was also a financial manager, no
additional criminals occurred in this trust network.
B. Result of first suspect test in 2-BCC financial manager network
The first suspect test was used on the 2-BCC financial managers’ network with the same financial officers used
as suspects. Figure 6 depicts the network formed when the union of financial managers’ subnetworks is extracted
using the shortest paths algorithm. We identified the links from Sherron Watkins (16929) and Jeff McMahon (8071)
to other nodes and obtained an unknown email address b..sanders@enron.com (1117) and Greg Piper (6667) as
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active intermediate nodes respectively. Common nodes are identified from the subgraph in Figure 6 when compared
to the subgraph in Figure 4. This is discussed in section VII. Again, no additional criminals were found.
Fig. 6: The 2-BCC financial managers’ shortest paths trust network. The MM (16383 - Sara Shackleton) and the
MI (19075 - Vince Kaminski) are indicated. Besides Andrew Fastow (686) and Ben Glisan (1369) who were also
financial managers in Enron, no additional criminals occurred in this trust network.
VII. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
A. Common node comparison
The subgraph in Figure 5 extracted from the 1-BCC email network using the financial managers contains 9
common nodes when compared to the subgraph in Figure 3 found using criminals. Some common nodes that
we would like to highlight here are Sara Shackleton (16383), Andrew Fastow (686), Louise Kitchen (11370) and
Vince Kaminski (19075). Subgraphs that were extracted from the 2-BCC email network show 10 common nodes.
Few of them are Ben Glisan (1369), Louise Kitchen (11370), Vince Kaminski (19075), Greg Piper (6667), Andrew
Fastow (686), Sara Shackleton (16383). We obtained atleast three criminals in the common nodes’ group; 1 criminal
(Andrew Fastow (686)) from financial managers 1-BCC shortest paths network and 2 criminals (Andrew Fastow
(686) and Ben Glisan (1369)) from financial managers 2-BCC shortest paths network.
In the first suspect test, starting with the financial managers, no additional known criminals appeared. However,
after obtaining these subgraphs, the next step an investigator can attempt is to explore each of these nodes’ history.
This is possible because these subgraphs are very sparse and small. Even though these people are not yet identified
as criminals during this first suspect test, further exploration of these nodes and trust relationships may lead to
discovering events that are related to money laundering.
B. Intermediate node comparison
The active intermediate nodes found in section V-A1 and V-B1 are Louise Kitchen (11370), Michael (Mike)
McConnell (12935), Jeff Skilling (8024), Greg Piper (6667) and Sherri Sera (16926). There were 2 out of 5 persons
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of interest occurring again when using financial managers as the list of first suspects. These are Louise Kitchen
(11370) and Greg Piper (6667). No matter the email contents and number of emails being exchanged, we take all
the active intermediaries obtained in section V-A1, V-B1 and section VI as persons of interest. We investigated
these nodes to see if they had any relationship to important events that occurred during the period leading up to
the Enron collapse.
Jeff Skilling was the president and Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Enron Corporation in December 1996 [33].
To support Enron’s fast growth in the 1990s, Skilling hired the best intellectuals for the company. This accounts
for the appointment of Michael (Mike) McConnell [30], [34] as the Executive Vice President, Technology, Enron
Corp., in July 1999. At the end of 1999, Enron Online came into being and Louise Kitchen, a trader at Enron
[30], [34] was the main person involved in its start-up. McConnell later helped to promote Enron Online [34].
The development of the Enron Online was hidden from the COO, Jeff Skilling by Louise Kitchen [35] with the
deployment of Enron online being revealed to him only two weeks before it was launched [35].
The next person of interest is Greg Piper. Greg Piper (6667) was the Managing Director of Enron NetWorks. He
supported the growth of the web based trading introduced by Louise Kitchen [36]. He was responsible for all of
Enron’s e-commerce systems development, such as EnronOnline and ClickPaper.com [36]. Thus, Louise Kitchen
and Greg Piper are both connected with Enron Online. Although we can’t prove that these identities are suspicious,
these interesting and intriguing emails indicate that they should be investigated further. In fact, Louise Kitchen
has been identified as an important node in prior research using node neighbourhood search, page rank [8] and
rule-based search on the Enron employee’s job field [37]. On the other hand, even though Sheri Sera occurred
most frequently between Kevin Hannon and other nodes, history does not indicate that she should be considered
suspicious [38].
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our shortest paths network search algorithm is able to capture a closely connected trust network. The algorithm
managed to show connections between nodes in 2 different scenarios; when an investigator knows all the criminals
and when the investigator is at the starting stage and doesn’t have any information about the criminals. The analyses
conducted in this paper show that when crime is suspected, our algorithm provides a means of identifying possible
people to investigate. It is the first step of an investigation: identifying trusted connections between known criminals
or financial managers with other active intermediate nodes in a network. Future work includes testing the efficacy
of our algorithm on a larger dataset and combining the node ranking with dependency methods to identify the most
trusted node of a known source.
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